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Abstract 
Decentralization is the fundamental policy variable used to enhance 
the allocative efficiency through public spending / tax priorities, 
subject to the local demand. The current study evaluates the impact 
of the various dimensions of decentralization on the economic growth 
of Pakistan for the years 1972-2018. Ng-Perron tests and 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) were applied to fix the 
unit root problem in the time series data. To find the cointegration 
among decentralization, the role of institutions, and economic growth 
the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Approach (ARDL) was used. The 
outcomes suggested that tax decentralization is a growth promoting 
policy. On the contrary, administrative and political decentralization 
negatively affect the economic growth. The analysis shows that 
political freedom also has a growth retarding impact on the 
economy. The current study is useful regarding the policy 
implications of the process of decentralization. 
Keywords: cointegration, decentralization, economic growth, 
political freedom 
JEL Classification: H77, D72, O47, C22 
Introduction 
Fiscal decentralization has been a growing trend in the developing 
and emerging economies over the course of last three decades 
(Filippetti & Sacchi, 2016). Most economies have restructured their 
political institutions and fiscal sovereignty at the lower tiers of the 
government, while aiming to enhance productivity and ultimately 
economic growth. There is a complex link between different 
dimensions of decentralization and economic growth. The available 
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literature fails to elaborate this link theoretically as well as 
empirically. A number of direct and indirect channels are available 
to find the association between macroeconomic development and 
fiscal federalism (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). Indeed, a 
number of studies have evaluated the mixed results of this 
phenomenon empirically (e.g., Bodman, 2011). 
Generally, decentralization has three dimensions including 
fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization and political 
decentralization (Schnieder, 2003). Fiscal decentralization is 
positively linked with economic growth. Moreover, it raises the 
possibility of competition among regional governments and allows 
for the efficient allocation of resources (Tiebout, 1956). The other 
two dimensions of decentralization, that is, administrative and 
political decentralization have bipolar impacts on economic growth 
(Schnieder, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). The impact of 
administrative decentralization and political decentralization on 
economic growth varies based on the measuring indices of 
decentralization. The most frequently used indices of administrative 
and political decentralization are designed by (Schnieder, 2003; 
Hooghe et al., 2002). 
Pakistan is a federation and the taxation system is centralized, 
even though the government of Pakistan has made considerable 
efforts to strengthen the decentralization mechanism (Iqbal et al., 
2012). Federal and provincial governments started sharing the tax 
revenue immediately after the independence of Pakistan. National 
Finance Commission (NFC) was constituted in 1951 for revenue 
sharing and distribution among the national and subnational 
governments, although it became functional under the constitution 
of 1973. Eight NFC awards have been announced till 2011. Before 
NFC awards, there was the Niemeyer Award in 1947, the Raisman 
Award in 1952 and the One Unit Formula in 1961 and 1965 for 
sharing the revenue. Conversely, political decentralization could not 
be proceeded. Three tiers of government exist in Pakistan, that is, 
the federal, provincial and the local government tiers. Political 
powers were not transferred from the provincial to the local bodies 
in the true sense. Linder (2009) specified decentralization as a 
helpful tool to formulate a structure that is useful in bringing the 
state closer to the citizens. In the case of political decentralization, 
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when powers are devolved to the local units, the chances of boosting 
the local initiatives, improvements in the public service delivery and 
organizing an efficient administration appears to be high. 
We relied on the index of political freedom (PF) published by 
the freedom house to define the institutional settings. We argued that 
decentralization has a stronger effect on the economic performance 
of Pakistan within an institutional structure which provides a higher 
level of subnational autonomy. To date, hardly any study has been 
examined the impact of fiscal, administrative and political 
decentralization on the economic performance of Pakistan. The aim 
of this paper is to explore the impact of decentralization on growth 
regulated by the presence of political institutions in Pakistan. 
Decentralized arrangements are those in which the central bodies 
have a minor role in the management of the day to day affairs of the 
local bodies and institutions. Subnational level governments are 
granted more autonomy in administration which shifts the burden of 
providing public services towards them. It is critical to study the 
different aspects of decentralization in order to recognize the 
exclusive features of all of its dimensions which differentiate them 
from each other. On the other hand, it may be acknowledged that all 
of these dimensions are closely related to each other. The theoretical 
framework of the current study is the endogenous growth model 
incorporated with decentralization and institutions. 
The structure of the remaining paper is as follows. Section II 
consists of the literature review on decentralization and growth 
outcomes. Section III addresses the theoretical framework, data and 
econometric issues. Section IV elaborates the empirical results and 
discussion and finally, Section V states the conclusion. 
Literature Review 
The fundamental justification of decentralization is that it brings 
decision-making closer to the local citizens. Decentralization 
enhances the redistribution of resources by prioritizing the public 
spending, subject to the local demand (Tiebout, 1956; Coase, 1960; 
Oates, 1985). The information regarding the functioning of public 
institutions in a decentralized system is accessible to the local people 
and it enables them to demand for public services, effectively. If 
citizens are taxed for the local services and the officials are held 
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accountable for their arrangements, it can create more incentives for 
the better provision of quality goods and services. 
Fiscal federalism may be related to different levels of efficiency 
in management and organization instead of centralization. The 
growth model of Solow-Swan (1956) is based on different levels of 
technology and total factor productivity. Hence, countries may show 
variations in their growth rate with the progress of decentralization. 
In a federal system, the innovation process is prompted efficiently 
from a theoretical perspective (Feld et al., 2012). Wallis (2000) 
argued from the historical perspective that fiscal decentralization 
(FD) is an imperative process that triggered the American economy 
from 1790 to 1990. Moreover, it can lead to greater fiscal stability 
and lower inflation while influencing growth (Thornton, 2007; 
Schaltegger & Feld, 2009; Baskaran & Feld, 2012). 
The literature explains the reasons behind the poor public 
service delivery to the local citizens. Economies of scales related to 
the central government may drop with the process of 
decentralization (Oats, 1972), whereas Smith (1985) argued that the 
local governments are technically deprived as compared to the 
central government. Hence, they are unable to manage efficient 
public service delivery. In another study, Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2006) evaluated the misallocation of public resources at the local 
level as these resources are captured by strong groups or the local 
elites in the decentralized system. Some researchers focused on the 
structure of political institutions which remains a prerequisite of an 
efficient decentralization mechanism (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; 
Rodden et al., 2003; Anderson, 2003). They recommended the 
presence of the local governments and institutions to sustain a 
functioning democracy, with the condition of the accountability of 
politicians for a successful decentralized system. Public 
administration scholars and economists stress the local 
government’s management ability and governance as necessary pre-
conditions of efficient decentralization aimed to respond to the local 
demands (Rondinelli et al., 1989; Grindle, 2007). The structure of 
the society itself is an important determinant of successful 
decentralization which depends on the actions of citizens instead of 
political and administrative structures. Moreover, the public sector 
remains under pressure from the various interest groups in the 
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society to provide superior public services to the citizens (Putnam, 
1993; Faguet, 2001; Heller, 2001). 
The positive effect of decentralization on well-being can be 
traced through prior studies. Kruse et al. (2012) determined the 
beneficial impact of the decentralization of the healthcare spending 
on successful healthcare provision for the poor in Indonesia. 
Baiocchi (2001) indicated that the welfare of the local citizens 
improved as a result of decentralization through the process of 
participatory budgeting in Brazil. Bjornskov et al. (2008) showed 
that the decentralization of revenue collection and spending 
improves the well-being, whereas more local autonomy is gained 
through public consumption expenditures. Similarly, Diaz-Serrano 
and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) found the positive impact of 
decentralization on individual happiness for twenty-nine European 
countries. Some studies equated effective decentralization with the 
structure of political institutions to enhance the provision of local 
public services and welfare (Ribot, 2007; Ganaie et al., 2018).  
Crook and Manor (1998) emphasized the importance of political 
institutions to mitigate the impact of decentralization reforms on the 
provision of public services. Functional local governments with 
accountability are the prerequisite of strong democratic institutions 
(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). Due to the lack of accountability, 
it may create rent-seeking behavior in the provision of public goods 
and services (Seabright, 1996). Riker (1964) suggested the presence 
of political institutions that ensure accountability in the local 
election, leading to the development of the association between the 
local government and electoral politics. The institutional mechanism 
is created through contestable and competitive local elections aimed 
to capture the local political elites and to counter corruption (Rose-
Ackerman, 2008; Nguyen et al., 2019).  
The local studies conducted in Pakistan have addressed the 
growth effect of fiscal decentralization (FD) only. Malik et a1. 
(2007) evaluated the effect of FD on Pakistan’s economic growth. 
The study examined the positive contribution of FD in the economic 
development of Pakistan for the time period 1971-2005. Khattak et 
al. (2010) considered FD as a significant policy variable aimed to 
ensure governance and to promote economic efficiency by giving 
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more fiscal autonomy to the provinces. For empirical findings, time 
series data was applied over the duration 1980-2007. Raza and Hina 
(2016) investigated the direct and the indirect impacts of FD on the 
economic growth of the provinces of Pakistan through spatial 
dependence. The outcomes of the study indicated that expenditure 
decentralization influences the provincial growth negatively, while 
revenue decentralization has a positive impact. 
Consequently, the current study is an effort to determine 
association among various dimensions of decentralization and the 
macroeconomic development of low income countries alike 
Pakistan besides the institutional settings. It is also abundantly clear 
from the literature review that only a limited amount of literature is 
available on transitional and developing economies that establishes 
a link between fiscal decentralization and the economic 
performance. This relationship requires more research work to offer 
clear designs for the policymakers to develop and recommend the 
effective implementation of decentralization in underdeveloped 
countries. Additionally, the current study investigates the issue of 
decentralization for the developing economies in general and 
focuses particularly on the significant determinants that positively 
enhance the economic growth of Pakistan. 
Theoretical Framework 
Fiscal decentralization depicts the transference of the responsibility 
of revenue (tax) generation from the federal to the provincial 
government. Several growth models on endogenous theory are used 
to find relationship of decentralization with economic development 
(Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Thieben, 2003; Lin & Liu, 2000), 
undertaking the method of Ordinary Least Square (OLS). The 
growth model used in this stud was originally developed by (Levine 
& Renelt, 1992). However, these empirical models have been 
applied on limited sample size that caused endogeneity. Prior 
research have also observed this issue employing different methods 
including instrumental variable technique (Iimi, 2005), regression 
models (Rodríguez‐Pose & Kroijir, 2009) following (Woller & 
Phillips, 1998), etc. For the purposes of the current study, a simple 
form of the model is given below: 
LGDPPCt = F(TDt, PFt, LGFCFt, LFt, LAIDt, PDt, PGRt)               (A) 
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LGDPPCt = F(ADt, PFt, LGFCFt, LFt, LAIDt, PDt, PGRt)                (B) 
LGDPPCt = F(PDt, PFt, LGFCFt, LFt, LAIDt, PGRt)                          (C) 
Where  
LGDPPCt is the measure of the GDP 
TD = Tax Decentralization, 
AD = Administrative Decentralization 
PD = Political Decentralization 
LF = Measure of the Total Labor Force 
GFCF = Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
AID = Foreign Aid 
PGR = Population Growth Rate 
1,2, ,  t N=  .  
In the growth related literature, numerous control variables have 
been extensively used (Barro & Lee, 1996).  
The model of tax decentralization for Pakistan was developed as 
follows:  
Model 1 
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐹𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡                                                    (1)  
The model of administrative decentralization for Pakistan was 
developed as follows:   
 Model 2   
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡                                                     (2)  
The model of political decentralization for Pakistan was 
developed as follows: 
Model 3                        
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐹𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡                                                                      (3)                          
Unit Root Tests 
KPSS Test  
Kwiatkowski et al., (1992) proposed a unit root test. It was 
designed in a way that the unit root problem pointed to the 
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alternative hypothesis rather than towards the traditional null 
hypothesis. The KPSS test is named after its authors. It is argued 
that the data remains stationary by design even if the unit root is 
absent from the data (Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2011). The general 
specification of KPSS is as follows: 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑡 
𝜔𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 
The null hypothesis is as follows: 
 𝐻0: 𝜎𝜇
2 = 0 
Nabeya and Tanaka (1988) discussed the special case of the 
above specification by stating the null hypothesis as having constant 
parameters, while the parameters of the alternative hypothesis 
contain a random walk: 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝑧𝑡 + 𝑡 
𝛼𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡;  μt ~ IID(0, σ_μ^2 ) with test statistic: 






Where the sum of error terms St is defined as: 




The above LM test is effective only if the μt are 𝐼𝐼𝐷, therefore, 
the need for the KPSS modified test-statistic. KPSS proposes a 
modification to the denominator of the LM-stat to consider the 
general case. The stationary test recommends the use of Newey-
West Hetroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Corrected (𝐻𝐴𝐶) long-
run estimation of the variance, instead of applying the error 
variance. 
The modified KPSS statistic is as follows: 





It is often recommended that KPSS can be applied to endorse the 
results of Philip-Peron (PP) and ADF tests. 
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Ng-Perron Unit Root Test  
Ng and Perron (2001) extended the M-tests of Elliott, 
Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) to modify the Z-tests. It illustrated 
that the adjusted power of MZ-tests rises considerably when 
Generalized Least square (GLS) and Modified Information Criteria 
(MIC) are used by detrending the data. It indicates significant power 
improvements, specifically when MA expressions lie in the 
fundamental Data Generating Process (DGP) using Monte Carlo 
(MC) tests to apply DF-GLS, if lag length is determined through 
MIC. Ng and Perron (2001) proposed a new test combining GLS 
detrending with SD. 
In order to implement the test, the estimation of Maximum 
Likelihood (𝑀𝐿) 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐴(𝑝. 1,1)𝑦𝑡 is as follows: 




and regain 𝜃 ?̂? 
The test-statistic is as follows: 
𝑠^𝜑 = 𝜖′^ W 𝜖^ 𝜎^𝜖
2 𝜎^𝜖
2 = 𝜖′^ × 𝜖^/ T runs a consistent 
estimate σ_ϵ^2; W is a TxT matrix such that 𝑊𝑖, 𝑗 = min (𝑖, 𝑗) 
Wij=min (i,j) and the residuals 𝜖^ are regained through regressing 
yt* on the intercept and time trend as: 
𝑦𝑡




LM illustrates that the asymptotic distribution of 𝑠^𝜑 is the same 
as the resultant distribution derived through KPSS. Therefore, the 
same critical values are applicable for testing the null of stationarity. 
ARDL Model to Cointegration 
The ARDL model is employed in this study owing to the 
following advantages over the cointegration models. Firstly, the 
ARDL model of cointegration is considered superior irrespective of 
the sample size, that is, whether the sample is small or finite and the 
number of observations in it remain between 30 and 80. Secondly, 
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the most important point regarding cointegration is that it is more 
useful for mixed order I(0) and I(1) of the stationarity of the 
variables. Thirdly, for both endogeniety and serial correlation 
problems, ARDL is correct with the appropriate lags (Pesaran et al., 
2001). Fourthly, the ARDL model can evaluate the short-run and 
long-run cointegration relationships simultaneously and offers 
unbiased estimates (Pesaran et al., 2001).  
The following equation was developed to estimate the long-run 
association and its coefficients: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑃𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛿𝑝∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑝
𝑘
𝑝=1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑞
𝑘
𝑞=0 ∆𝑃𝐹𝑡−𝑞 + ∑  𝜗𝑗∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=0 + 𝑖𝑡            (4) 
where symbol ∆ exhibits the variable change. 
Engle and Granger (1987) conducted Vector Auto Regression 
(VAR) for estimations and found that these estimates were not stable 
when the data set was converted into the first difference. Error 
Correction Model (ECM) was formulated through the ARDL 
approach to detect the long-run cointegration amid variables in order 
to estimate the best fitted model. Subsequently, the first lagged 
period error term was assimilated in the ARDL model to get 
significant and efficient estimates. The improved VECM is 
presented as follows: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝑃𝐹𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑞∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑞
𝑝
𝑞=0 +
𝜃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                          (5) 
Construction and Description of Variables 
Decentralization Measures 
Tax Decentralization. It was measured by the portion of the 
provincial government’s tax pool in the tax revenues of the federal 




𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 
The data was obtained from the numerous issues of the Pakistan 
Statistical Year Book (e.g., Pakistan Statistical year book 2002. 
2010, 2018). The graph shows that tax decentralization has been an 
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increasing trend since 1990. It increased from 23% to 39% between 
1990 and 2018. 
Figure 1 
Tax Decentralization in Pakistan 
 
Administrative Decentralization. Administrative decentralization 
can be measured by examining the control applied over the local 
revenue. The ratio of local taxes from the total revenue is an 
indicator of the level of subnational control over the resources 
(Schneider, 2003). It is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝐷 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 
Figure 2  
Administrative Decentralization in Pakistan 
 
Data was collected from the various issues of the Pakistan 
Statistical Year Book (e.g., 50 years of Pakistan Vol III and IV, 
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decentralization increased from 0.68 to 0.89 between 1990 and 
2018. 
Political Decentralization. Schneider (2003) defines the 
mechanism of political system in a country that is constituted 
through the national and local elections by assigning the values (0-
6) for an index. The value 1 denotes the oath taking of the members 
of the national assembly as well as members of local body in each 
province (Punjab, Sindh, KPK and Baluchistan). Correspondingly, 
the value 1/4 presents the oath taking of the members of provincial 
assembly. It also takes the value of 1 if the local body members take 
oath in each province. If all the members of national, provincial and 
local bodies take oath in a year, it will be presented with maximum 
value 6. Whereas, the minimum value 0 is used in the absence of 
oath taking in setup of national / provincial and local body members. 
Political Freedom 
The political freedom index is used as a proxy for the 
institutions. It is constructed by averaging civil liberty and political 
rights. The index value varies from 0 to 7, where 7 indicates ‘no 
freedom’ and 0 stands for a ‘fully free’ country. The relevant data 
for Pakistan from 1972 to 2018 has an average of 4.7. It shows the 
relative weakness of the governing institutions of Pakistan. Previous 
studies have examined economic growth as influential factors of 
civil liberty, political rights (Aixalá & Fabro, 2009). The data source 
is freedom house. 
Control Variables 
Total labor force is used as the proxy of the human capital. Time 
series data for the human capital was collected from the various 
issues of the Economic Survey of Pakistan (Economic survey of 
Pakistan, 2000, 2010, 2018). Time series data was taken for the time 
period 1972-2018. Foreign aid is considered to be a growth 
promoting factor for under developed economies conditioned with 
sound trade, as well as sound monetary and fiscal policies (Burnside 
& Dollar, 2000). The proxy for foreign aid is the official aid received 
and net official development assistance. World Development 
Indicators (WDIs) were the source of the data. Physical capital is an 
important factor in economic growth. A positive association was 
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established between the physical capital and the performance of the 
economy (Jan et al., 2012). The proxy for physical capital is used as 
the log of gross fixed capital formation. The data for physical capital 
was taken from the WDIs. The production function contains both 
the human and the physical capital. The control variable of this study 
is population growth rate as it cannot be ignored in growth theory 
(Sala-i-Martin, 1997). The study has used data taken from the WDIs 
(Online data base). 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
The variable “Log of GDP Per Capita (LGDPPC)” was used as 
dependent variable in this study.  The results of Table 1 shows that 
the average value of LGDPPC is 2.68. The variables in log forms 
have been used except the decentralization ratios and the population 
growth rate.  
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Max Min Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
GDP Per Capita 47 3.1709 1.9928 2.6795 2.6512 0.2982 
Tax 
Decentralization 
47 0.3811 0.1772 0.2706 0.2844 0.0596 
Administrative 
Decentralization 
47 0.8924 0.3422 0.7110 0.0777 0.1370 
Political 
Decentralization 
47 1.0000 0.0000 0.4728 0.3333 0.3189 
Political 
Freedom 
47 6.0000 3.0000 4.7948 4.5000 0.8249 




47 10.5128 9.3617 9.9865 9.9711 0.3226 
Foreign Aid 47 9.5577 8.7894 9.0974 9.0302 0.2142 
Population 
Growth Rate 
47 3.4169 1.6851 2.6028 2.6454 0.6021 
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The descriptive statistical summary of the selected variables is 
given in the above table-1. The mean values for the variables tax 
decentralization (TD), administrative decentralization (AD) and 
political decentralization (PD) are 0.27, 0.711 and 0.7286, 
respectively. The mean value for the variable labor force (LF) is 
1.560375 with the standard deviation of 0.1347, while the mean 
value for the variable average capital (GFCF) is 9.986509 with the 
standard deviation of 0.322. According to the statistical analysis, the 
mean values for the variables foreign aid (AID) and population 
growth rate (PGR) in Pakistan are 9.097, and 2.60, respectively. 
Table 2  













LGDPPC 0.7921 0.0764* 1.6475 -7.7201*** 
TD 0.1492* 0.0928 -8.5213** -20.1555* 
AD 0.7997 0.5000** -3.1553 -19.3236* 
PD 0.0885* 0.1141* -10.6803** -20.5000* 
PF 0.0829* 0.0839 -7.0112*** -20.4153* 
LF 0.8239 0.1019* -0.1629 -20.4145* 
LGFCF 0.8019 0.1320* 1.2226 -7.9400*** 
LAID 0.7535 0.2451* 0.7354 -39.5224* 
PGR 0.6705** 0.2337* -463.131* -6.4248*** 
(*, **, *** show stationarity at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
The outcomes of both unit root tests, that is, KPSS and Ng-
Perron are elaborated in the above Table 2. The dependent variable, 
that is, the GDP per capita remains stationary at the first difference 
for both KPSS and Ng-Perron tests. The explanatory variables, that 
is, TD, PD, PF, and PGR remain stationary at level, while other 
variables including AD, LF, GFCF and AID remain stationary at the 
first difference. 
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Table 3 





























2.32 3.5          Co-
integration 
The results of the bound test for cointegration are presented 
below in Table 3. The findings show the F-statistics for three models 
which are above the upper bound critical value, so cointegration 
exists. 
The best performing ARDL models were selected on the bases 
of the resulting ARDL-ECM parameters. Akaike information and 
Schwarz information criteria were used in the current study. The 
optimal numbers of lags for each of the variables of the models 1 -3 
are ARDL (1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 2, 0, 0), ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 0, 1) and 
ARDL (1, 0, 2, 0, 2, 2, 2), respectively. The empirical result showed 
that linear combinations exist in the concerned variables in the long-
run. 
The results of tax decentralization are reported in Table 4 below. 
For Model 1, the empirical findings revealed that the coefficient of 
tax decentralization is positive and significant at 5% level of 
significance. Hence, it contributes to the economic growth of 
Pakistan positively and significantly. The outcomes are consistent 
with the basic theory of decentralization. The greater is the tax 
decentralization, the higher is the economic growth. The provinces 
receive more autonomy in the allocation of resources with a greater 
degree of tax decentralization. Again, the outcomes are consistent 
with the previous literature which reflects that revenue 
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decentralization promotes economic growth in Pakistan (Iqbal et al., 
2012). Political freedom has positive and significant impact on 
economic growth. The interpretation of the negative impact of 
political freedom makes it difficult for the provincial governments 
to internalize the economies of scale and other externalities in the 
provision of public goods and services. It implies that the elected 
governments of provinces focus only on the areas in their respective 
jurisdictions as they are too accountable to the local citizens. Such 
conduct hinders cooperation and policy coordination between the 
federal and provincial governments. Similar results regarding the 
negative impact of excessive political freedom were yielded by the 
previous studies (Iimi, 2005). 
Table 4 
Long-run Estimates (Dependent Variable=LGDPPC) 
Variables Model-1   
(1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 2, 
0, 0) 
Model-2 
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 
0, 1) 
Model-3  
(1, 0, 2, 0, 2, 
2, 2) 
TD 0.2931  
[0.0232]** 
_ _ 
AD       _ -0.0836  
[.0999]*** 
_ 










































 (*, **, *** show stationarity at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
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Many control variables were incorporated in the estimated 
model to determine the growth impact of tax decentralization in 
Pakistan. The coefficient of the physical capital is positive and 
significant. It indicates that the higher is the investment in the real 
stock, the greater is the GDP per capita. Human capital contributes 
to economic growth positively and significantly. The positive and 
significant coefficient of foreign aid shows that it promotes 
economic growth. The outcomes are consistent with the findings of 
the prior empirical studies that postulated foreign aid as growth 
promoting for the low-income countries (Qayyum & Haider, 2012). 
Political decentralization has a negative but insignificant effect on 
the economic growth of Pakistan. Population growth rate positively 
and significantly contributes to economic growth at 1% level. The 
outcomes are consistent with the prior empirical findings postulating 
that the population growth rate positively enhances the economic 
growth of Pakistan (Ali et al., 2013).  
The results of administrative decentralization in Model 2 
depicted in Table 4 show that the coefficient of administrative 
decentralization is negative but significant. The negative sign shows 
that it is growth retarding, supporting the interpretation that 
decentralization appears to have an unfavorable impact on the 
performance of the economy. The measure of administrative 
decentralization depicts the autonomy of the provinces for 
generating their own sources of tax revenue and it may foster 
corruption. The reason behind the negative impact may be that the 
provincial governments are technically deprived as compared to the 
central government in the allocation of resources and are unable to 
manage efficient public service delivery. The outcomes are 
consistent with prior studies that administrative decentralization 
decreases economic growth (e.g., Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). 
Inverse outcomes of political freedom imply that the elected 
governments of the provinces focus only on their jurisdictions as 
they are too accountable to the local citizens. Such conduct hinders 
cooperation and policy coordination between the federal and 
provincial governments. 
For Model 2, the coefficient of physical capital is positive and 
significant. It indicates that the higher is the investment in the real 
stock, the greater is the GDP per capita. Human capital contributes 
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to economic growth positively and significantly. The positive and 
significant coefficient of foreign aid shows that it promotes 
economic growth. The outcomes confirm the empirical results of the 
prior studies that greater political decentralization may boost 
corruption in weak institutions (e.g., Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 
2010). Moreover, population growth rate positively and 
significantly contributes to economic growth at 1% level.  
The results of the Model 3 indicate that the negative coefficient 
of political decentralization has a growth retarding impact. The 
results are statistically significant at 1% level. The outcomes 
confirm the empirical results of prior studies (e.g., Rodriguez-Pose 
& Ezcurra, 2010). The significant positive aspect of political 
freedom shows more economic growth with less freedom. The 
interpretation of the negative effect of political freedom makes it 
difficult for the provincial governments to internalize the economies 
of scale and other externalities in the provision of the public goods 
and services. It implies that the elected governments of the 
provinces focus only on their jurisdictions as they are too 
accountable to local citizens. Such conduct hinders cooperation and 
policy coordination between the federal and provincial 
governments. 
For Model 3, the coefficient of the physical capital is positive 
and significant. It indicates that the higher is the investment in the 
real stock, the greater is the GDP per capita. Human capital 
contributes to economic growth positively and significantly. The 
positive and significant coefficient of foreign aid shows that it 
promotes economic growth. Moreover, population growth rate 
positively and significantly contributes to economic growth at 1% 
level. 
Short-run outcomes are elaborated in the Table 5. The tax 
decentralization, administrative decentralization and political 
decentralization all are significant. However, there is no significant 
impact on economic growth of political institutions. In Model 1, 
political decentralization has an insignificant impact. The controlled 
variables i.e. population growth rate, physical capital, and foreign 
aid have a significant impact on economic growth. With the 
introduction of first period lagged ECM, a stable and long-run 
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equilibrium can be obtained through the speed of adjustment. With 
the significant negative coefficient of ECM (-1), the convergence 
towards the long-run equilibrium is determined (Bannerjee et al., 
1998). Hence, convergence hypothesis is confirmed as the 
coefficient of ECM (-1) is negative and significant. The speed of 
adjustment to achieve the long-run equilibrium is almost 60 percent, 
64 percent and again 64 percent for the models 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. 
Table 5 
Short-run Estimates (Dependent variable=∆LGDPPC)  






















































(*, ** show stationarity at 1% and 5%) 
The outcomes of different diagnostic tests are elaborated in the 
Table 6. These include the Jarque-Bera test, which confirms the 
normality of the data for all models. Similarly, there is no 
multicollinearity and hetroskedasticity as manifested by the LM test 
and Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test respectively and the models are 
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correctly specified. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ confirm the stability 
of all three models at 5% level of significance. 
Table 6  
Diagnostic Checking for ARDL 





















































Decentralization is the policy variable used to enhance the 
allocative efficiency through public spending / tax priorities, subject 
to the local demand. The current study evaluates the impact of the 
various dimensions of decentralization on the economic growth of 
Pakistan for the years 1972-2018. The outcomes of the study showed 
that tax decentralization positively contributes to the economic 
growth of Pakistan. The empirical findings are consistent with the 
basic theory of decentralization. The greater is the tax 
decentralization, the higher is the economic growth. The provinces 
get more autonomy in the allocation of resources with a greater 
degree of tax decentralization.  
The outcomes showed that administrative decentralization is 
negative but significant. The negative sign shows that it is growth 
retarding, which supports the interpretation that decentralization 
appears to have an unfavorable impact on the performance of the 
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economy. The measure of administrative decentralization depicts 
the autonomy of the provinces in generating their own sources of tax 
revenues and it may foster corruption. The reason behind the 
negative impact may be that the provincial governments are 
technically deprived as compared to the central government in the 
allocation of resources and are unable to manage efficient public 
service delivery. Political decentralization negatively affects 
economic growth and statistically, it is significant. 
The significant and positive political freedom shows more 
economic growth with less freedom. The interpretation of the 
negative effect of political freedom makes it difficult for the 
provincial governments to internalize the economies of scale and 
other externalities in the provision of public goods and services. It 
implies that the elected governments of the provinces focus only on 
their jurisdictions as they are too accountable to the local citizens. 
Such conduct hinders cooperation and policy coordination between 
the federal and provincial governments. 
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